Air India Flight 171 Crash: Non-Mandatory, Not-Adopted Advisory

Although the full causes of the Air India Flight 171 accident are still under investigation, the preliminary report offers important insights worth reflecting on.

On 12 June 2025, Air India Flight 171, a Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner registered VT-ANB, crashed just 32 seconds after takeoff from Ahmedabad Airport, India, en route to London Gatwick Airport. The accident resulted in 260 fatalities, including 241 onboard and 19 on the ground. There was only one survivor onboard, who escaped with multiple minor injuries. This is the first fatal accident involving a 787 Dreamliner since the aircraft entered service in 2011.

Shortly after takeoff, both engines immediately shut down and stopped producing thrust, resulting in the loss of critical hydraulic and electrical power supplied by the engines. Despite the deployment of the Ram Air Turbine (RAT), which provided emergency hydraulic and electrical power, the aircraft quickly lost altitude and control, the pilots struggled to maintain control, rapidly lost altitude, ultimately crashing into nearby buildings and igniting a large fire.

The preliminary report released by India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) reveals that both fuel control switches were inadvertently moved from the RUN to the CUTOFF position during flight, one second apart, causing the loss of thrust in both engines. These fuel control switches are typically operated only on the ground during engine startup and shutdown. In flight, cutting off fuel to an engine is reserved for emergency situations, such as an engine fire or a serious malfunction that requires shutting down or restarting the engine.

According to the CVR data, there was no indication of deliberate human intervention in moving the fuel control switches. The exact reason for their inadvertent movement remains undetermined and under further investigation.

Back in 2018, following reports from Boeing operators that the fuel control switches were installed with the locking feature disengaged, the FAA issued Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) NM-18-33 “Engine Fuel and Control“. This bulletin recommended inspecting the locking feature of the fuel control switch to ensure it was properly engaged, and replacing the switch at the earliest opportunity if it could be moved without lifting it up.

Fuel Control Switches.

Based on the FAA's assessment, the airworthiness concern was issued as a SAIB, an informational tool used to alert and make recommendations to the aviation community when the issue is not considered an unsafe condition that would warrant an Airworthiness Directive. Although SAIBs are not mandatory, they include recommendations intended to improve the safety of a product. Operators are expected to evaluate them and determine whether the recommendations apply to their fleet or operations based on a risk assessment.

As per the preliminary accident report, all applicable Airworthiness Directives were complied on the aircraft and engines by Air India, but the recommended inspections of the potential for disengagement of the fuel control switch locking feature as per the SAIB were not carried out.

While the real causes of the accident are still under investigation, the facts detailed in the preliminary report of this recent tragedy highlight the critical need for effective embodiment policies based on risk assessment, even when regulatory action is not mandated.

Don’t miss next week’s post where we’ll explore the Assessment of Non-Mandatory Information and the Operator’s Embodiment Policy. If you’re interested in developing an internal policy that helps make sure important information isn’t missed, this might be a useful resource for you.

If you want to accelerate your understanding, consider exploring our advanced expert course Aircraft Maintenance Programs. It covers the Operator’s Embodiment Policy and many other key topics designed to help maintain high airworthiness standards in detail.